[milwaukee-electric] Re: Milwaukee slums during the 1940s and afterward

[Gary Schnabl]

On 11/8/2010 10:53 PM, Scott Greig wrote:
> --- On Mon, 11/8/10, Gary Schnabl<gSchnabl at SWDetroit.com>  wrote:
>> How come there never was any effective block signals or other mechanisms
>> for not allowing two cars on the HC line simultaneously--without being
>> overridden manually? Railroads had installed adequate interlocking
>> switches and signals several decades before 1950...
> It's important to remember that, once off the Rapid Transit Line or M-R-K, TMER&L was essentially a 1916 interurban in terms of technology.  The signals weren't upgraded beyond Nachods on much of the system because, for the level and nature of service operated, they worked fine.  Plus, TMER&L imposed a strict system of training on their operating personnel and followed it with strong oversight, so that it all worked.  And after TMER&L made the decision to get out of the transportation business in 1934-35, they weren't about to make the capital investment in upgrading signal systems on lines they planned to abandon anyway.
>
> After looking at all the published details of the Labor Day wreck, I've concluded that the failure that day was far more of a human one than a mechanical one.  TMER&L ran a high-pressure system that, in typical Germanic thinking, worked like a Swiss watch as long as all variables were under control.  What they never anticipated was that somebody without the proper training and mindset, but with authority that overrode all else (i.e. the owner), would be introduced into the system.
>
>> Besides, in 1950, two-way radios were not that rare or expensive. I was
>> a radio amateur since my grade-school days (1957), using mostly
>> inexpensive WW2 or Korean-war equipment for receivers and
>> transmitters--modified the shortwave gear that the B-17 bombers used
>> (for higher power and better operation)..
> Ed Tennyson made mention of some test use of a Trainphone apparatus...but was that really necessary?  The line ran primarily off the employee timetable/headway sheet and/or train orders, and there were mandatory call-in points at key intersections like West Junction.  As long as the system TMER&L had developed over years of service was understood and followed, all would work.
>
> Also, remember that Maeder had very little money to work with.  He had been sold the line for $100 plus court costs, but on the condition that he take on all the liabilities from the Labor Day wreck of August 1949, so he started business off in the red.  KMCL/Greyhound knew that he wanted the line, and made it clear that this was the only way they'd sell it to him.  Tennyson had advanced Maeder money on a couple of occasions for useful purchases (like the 60-series curvesiders), but because of the rift between them Maeder often did not let on to Tennyson what he had in mind.
>
>> How did the operation keep in touch with the utility cars on active
>> tracks? I would tend to agree that the ill-fated 1950 accident was
>> bordering on negligent, criminal activity. Too bad... Otherwise, the RTL
>> would have been able to purchase insurance and maybe be solvent for
>> another decade or so.
> They operated on train orders, were expected to keep track of the regular timetable and know where they were in the mix, and they were to call the dispatcher otherwise for orders and clearances.  It was all a matter of understanding the system and following it...and on September 2, 1950, it wasn't.
>
>> As for the line remaining in place with a Freeway alongside..... really
>> questionable. The Planners wanted the prow between downtown and 28th
>> street, for their construction purposes.  Certainly, it was cheaper to
>> build on that prow, than to condemn other real-estate in the Valley.
>>
>> Politics demanded the RTL be retired.
> I agree completely...as owner of the right-of-way, WEPCo was the ultimate arbiter of the Rapid Transit Line's fate.  I'm sure they would have been happy to get non-transmission-line property off their books and an "interloper" off their hands...even without the Labor Day wreck, who knows what might have happened if WEPCo received a suitable offer for the Rapid Transit Line's right-of-way from the highway commission.
>
> Scott.
What you described is a system that was designed and operated with about 
zero redundancy--much like the Interstate bridge that failed in 
Minneapolis that had a basic truss design without redundancy, as many 
older bridges had. One critical member fails, and the whole system comes 
down. Many aircraft functions have triple (sometimes even higher) 
redundancy.

Besides, dispatchers can fall asleep too on the job from time to time if 
the job is essentially that of a Maytag repairman. In case a car needed 
to stop rapidly, how much distance would be required at normal operating 
speeds? Was that part of the HC line pretty much obscured or whatever in 
visibility?


-- 

Gary Schnabl
Southwest Detroit, two miles NORTH! of Canada--Windsor, that is...