[PRCo] Re: METRORAIL DISASTER

[John Swindler]

APTA reported today that it is 14 times more dangerous to drive rather than use public transit.  No matter what the number might be, depending on how calculated and what is included, it is significantly safer to be on a bus or train.  We kill about four people each day on Pennsylvania Highways.

 

John

 

 

 

 

 


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From: fwschneider at comcast.net
Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2009 09:46:13 -0400
To: etennyson at cox.net


Except that I've been criticized, and rightfully so for a flaw in proof reading by Phil Craig.   There should have been a "no" after the word men.   I have inserted it below in red.


On Jun 26, 2009, at 12:04 AM, Edson Tennyson wrote:
THANK YOU, FRED, for that cogent comment.
   By my rough calculations, I think 12 people on board MetroRail trains have been killed in 33 years
which I estimate is 0.04 fatalities per 100 million  passenger-miles. The auto rate is about 0.9,   22.5 times
mote dangerous than MetroRail, but still, I would disconnect that stupid automation for good.  It is just an
extra cost with less than no redeeming value.  Old fashioned automatic train stop was almost, not quite perfect
E d    T e n n y s o n



On Jun 24, 2009, at 3:44 PM, Schneider Fred wrote:

I have a problem with the word disaster in conjunction with an accident that killed nine people on a system that moves a million people a day, year in and year out to be stretching things just a tad.   So we've had three major accidents was it in 33 years and in that time they have moved probably somewhere on the order of magnitude of 6 billion revenue passengers.   I think that's a pretty damn good record.


Gentlemen:    There are no women who are 10s.   There are no men who are 10s.   There is no such thing as perfection.   It does not exist.   


But I'll happily take my chances on WMATA before the Beltway around DC or I-70 or I-95 or the Shirley Highway or I-64.


Fred Schneider




On Jun 24, 2009, at 9:09 AM, Jack May wrote:


‘ "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager John B. Catoe Jr. said.’
 
 
 
Red Line Train Operator Used Brakes In Failed Bid to Stop Six-Car Train
Investigators Probe Site for Cause of Crash
By Lena H. Sun and Lyndsey Layton, Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
 
The operator of the Metro train that slammed into a stationary train in
front of it apparently had activated the emergency brakes in a failed effort
to stop before the accident, federal officials said yesterday as they
searched for the cause of Monday's Red Line wreck that killed nine and
injured 80. Debbie Hersman of the National Transportation Safety Board said
the emergency brake button, known as the "mushroom," was depressed, and the
steel rails showed evidence that the brakes were engaged. Investigators also
said the striking train was in automatic mode, which means onboard computers
should have controlled its speed and stopped it before it got too close to
the stationary train. In addition, Metro sources said, the first two cars of
that train were two months overdue for scheduled maintenance of some braking
components.
 
Taken together, experts say these facts point to several possible scenarios:
The operator activated the brakes too late; the computers that are supposed
to stop a train from getting too close to another train faltered; the
train's brakes failed; or some combination of those. Some passengers on the
striking train have said that they never felt the train slow down. A team of
NTSB investigators painstakingly searched through the tangled heap of metal
on the tracks just north of the Fort Totten Station in Northeast Washington.
They were examining everything: the condition of the trains, track and
signals; the actions of the operator and her downtown supervisors; and the
computers that control train movement and are supposed to automatically
prevent crashes. Investigators will also look at maintenance work performed
this month on the computerized train control system along the stretch of
track where the crash took place.
 
Officials began to remove the cars from the trains yesterday and plan to try
to experiment with similar trains to determine approximate speed and
stopping distance, Hersman said. Service on the Red Line will continue to be
disrupted while the investigation proceeds. The crash, the force of which
vaulted the striking train atop the one it rammed, occurred on a curve where
the speed limit is 59 mph, Hersman said. Today's experiment will also try to
determine whether the curve, or anything else, obstructed the train
operator's view of the stopped train. The operator, Jeanice McMillan, 42,
was among those who died in the accident. Investigators will examine her
cellphone and text-messaging records, review her work and rest schedule, and
analyze blood samples, all standard NTSB procedures. Investigators are also
delving into the automatic train protection system, which is designed to
make collisions impossible. Had the system been working correctly, it would
have sensed that Train 112 was getting too close to Train 214 and directed
the brakes aboard Train 112 to engage.
 
"I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager John B.
Catoe Jr. said. Catoe said it was too early in the investigation to know
what caused the crash, but he said there was "no evidence" that the operator
was using a cellphone or texting at the time of the crash. After a special
board meeting yesterday, he told reporters, "There's not a letter of
evidence" to indicate operator error. And right now, he said, there is also
no indication of signal failure.
 
The six cars that made up Train 112 were put together in an unusual way.
Metro trains operate in married pairs of cars, and the lead car is almost
always an "A" car, which some operators say run more smoothly and
communicate better with the electronic devices buried along the track. But
in the case of Train 112, the lead car was a "B" car, Metro officials said.
It was unclear last night why the train was configured that way. It was also
unclear what effect, if any, the configuration could have had on the crash.
The cars were among the oldest in Metro's fleet, purchased between 1974 and
1978 from Rohr Industries for the opening of the subway system. They have
been rehabilitated and retrofitted "to keep them in good condition," said
Metro board Chairman Jim Graham of the District. But federal investigators
consider the cars to be unsafe because of a tendency during a crash to
collapse into one another like a telescope, reducing the "survivability"
space, or the area in a car in which passengers can escape harm. The force
of the impact sheared the lead car of Train 112, pushing part of it onto the
roof of the trailing car of Train 214 and slamming the rest into the body of
Train 214. Two-thirds of Train 112's lead car was crushed, Hersman said.
 
After a Rohr train telescoped during a 2004 crash at the Woodley
Park-Zoo/Adams Morgan Station, the NTSB recommended that Metro retire the
Rohrs or strengthen their frames to prevent collapse. But the transit agency
declined, saying that the cars make up one-third of the fleet and that Metro
could not afford to mothball them ahead of their planned retirement in 2014,
and that retrofitting would be costly and impractical. The NTSB, which makes
safety recommendations but has no enforcement authority, disagreed with
Metro's stance, calling it "unacceptable" at the time.
 
Yesterday, Hersman again questioned the safety of the Rohr cars and blamed
Metro for failing to act. "We recommended to [Metro] to either retrofit
those cars or phase them out of service," she said. "Those concerns were not
addressed." Metro uses 290 1000 series cars, which make up more than 25
percent of its 1,126-car fleet. Graham said replacing the cars would cost
almost $1 billion, money that Metro does not have. Metro is the only major
transit system in the country without a source of dedicated funds. The
agency appeals every year to the District, Virginia and Maryland for
funding, a situation that makes long-term planning difficult.
 
The NTSB also recommended that Metro install data recorders, similar to the
black boxes found in airplanes, in all of its cars after the 2004 crash.
Although the agency installed recorders in some of its newest cars, the Rohr
cars did not have them -- a condition that Hersman also called unacceptable.
Metro officials also did not install critical software revisions that would
have allowed investigators to determine whether the operator had applied the
emergency brakes and the train's speed during braking, according to a source
knowledgeable about the braking systems. Investigators might be able to
determine whether the emergency brakes were deployed based on physical
evidence.
 
Metro's automated system is built around electronic relays on the trains and
buried along the track that allow onboard computers to control speeds and
stop trains from getting too close to one another. Over the past decade,
Metro has struggled with troublesome relays. The agency tore out all 20,000
trackside relays in 1999 after discovering that a small portion designed to
last 70 years were failing after 25. The manufacturer, Alstom Signaling,
agreed to replace the relays at a cost to Metro of about $8 million. None of
the new relays have failed, one Metro official said. The NTSB and the
Federal Transit Administration have criticized Metro for failing to act
aggressively to address safety problems, especially at the time of a 1996
crash at Shady Grove
that killed a train operator.
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Edson Tennyson [mailto:etennyson at cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 12:54 AM
To: Al Schneider; Gary Olden; Lyndon Henry <NAWDRy at bga.com> <NAWDRy at bga.com>
Cc: CRVLKOTULA at aol.com; fwschneider at comcast.net; philgcraig204 at yahoo.com; j_swindler at hotmail.com; billvigrass at verizon.net; bob.dietrich1 at verizon.net; bbente at bellsouth.net; trams2 at comcast.net; allmanr at verizon.net; rejmhj at netzero.net; shadow at dementia.org; Akftrain at aol.com; miklosfrank at comcast.net; jack.may at americomm.net; jaurelius at centurytel.net; russell.jackson at stvinc.com
Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
 
 SHADY GROVE REAR END ACCIDENT THAT KILLED MOTORMAN
 I do not know which kind of car was in the Shady Grove fatality, but it had nothing to do with
the car body design other than the brakes. It was a faulty brake design.  All cars have the same faulty
brake design.
  The brake design is very similar to my Silverliner commuter cars in Philadelphia we bought in 1964, ten
years before Rohr.  Budd invented a disc brake and wanted to sell it.  They sold it to Califorfnia Zephyr 
and similar good trains and they demanded we take it. I  said "NO."  The railroads said "yes"  It was good
enough for Zeohyrs. it was good enough for fhem, It would  save wheel  wear. It really wouid. I agree.
  The problems were (1) we used no locomotives with brake shoes (and maybe dynamic brakes)  to clean the 
wheels and rail.  (2) Dirty wheels  do not shunt signals well enough. (3) DIrty wheels may slide.
  We wanted dynamic brakes but P.RR would not allow them on eMU cars. They falsely said it would cost too 
much to maintain the motors.  Research said otherwise but they were steadfast.  My boss  told me there would
be no new cars if I did not give in so I had to accept a lousy brake system.
   In very cold, fine snow weather, with very cold wheels, ice builds up on the faces of the brake pads that grip the
frozen brake discs.  There is no brake as a result, until it wears off and warms up.  Too late. and  several wrecks 
but not bad enough to get top level attention  UNTIL a train passed up the Chairman of the Board, Stuart Saunders
and his chief of staff.  FIRE THE MOTORMAN !  Yes sir. The union had a grievance proceedure and  blamed 
the brakes.  They often do that but time they were right. The procedure got the motorman his job back and
the Chairman of the Board ordered  disc brakes off the cars.  In  two weeks we had a whole fleet with tread brakes 
and warm wheels.  Hot wheels some times, which was not good, but was safer than no winter brakes. I got the bill
but I refused to pay it and told them why. They dod not sue me.  
WMATA had the very same problem, and dynamic brakes made it worse with colder wheels.
  The WMATA motorman knew he was in bad trouble so he asked the dispatcher (controller) for permission to cut
out the automation which knew nothing about very cold brakes. The central control did not have the gumption to 
say "OK" so they said "NO".  The Assistant General Manager insisted on automatic operation at all times.
Within 15 minutes of being  denied permission  the poor dumb motorman was dead.  I say dumb because it would have
been better to lose his job than his life. He was a very good man but he followed evil orders. That Assistant General
Manager was soon gone..  He was in many ways, an excellent manager but he was far too headstrong.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               E d   T e n n y s o n   
 
 
On Jun 24, 2009, at 12:56 AM, alschneider2 at juno.com wrote:



Wasn't the Shady Grove disaster that killed the operator also involve Rohrs?
And the Rhode Island Av collision that destroyed one Rohr occurred around 1980.

 
                      Alan L. Schneider


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