[PRCo] Re: [Fwd: PRC Facts from Ed Tennyson]

[Fred Schneider]

In looking over what Ed and I both wrote six months ago, we should note that these
streetcar and bus comparisons can be attempts to compare apples and prunes ... maybe
even apples and shoes.

Ed pointed out that wages differed in one city between buses and trolley operators, a
concession because of different sized vehicles.  Operators of streetcars often
received more than motormen because operators were doing duties of two men.  Wages
scales were critical in any analysis.

Even more critical is an analysis of what types of routes were bus and what kinds of
routes were rail.  After 1946 on Manhattan Island, everything was bus so direct
comparisons between rail and bus profitibility were possible.

However, in Pittsburgh, most of the heavily patronized routes were rail.  The earlier
bus routes were naturally those that didn't make money as rail lines, and hence they
were the first to go. There were also some bus routes that were developed from day one
with motor vehicles because the era of trolley construction had ended.   Those routes
can not be used to make general comparisons with all rail lines because they are not
the same.  By the 1950s most Pittsburgh rail routes were trunk lines that went into
downtown Pittsburgh (or once went into downtown like Donora, 81, 9, 12, and so forth);
most bus routes connected with rail routes in the suburbs.  (Suburbs here is a generic
term meaning outside the urban core; with each generation the suburbs are farther
out.)  Therefore it becomes very obvious that the rail routes in Pittsburgh in the
early 1950s should have made a profit even if the bus routes did not, ikf only because
they carried far more people..

Jim Holland wrote:

> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: [PRCo] PRC Facts from Ed Tennyson
> Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2003 18:42:10 -0400
> From: Fred Schneider <fschnei at supernet.com>
> Reply-To: pittsburgh-railways at dementia.org
> To: pittsburgh-railways at dementia.org
>
> I had asked a question about economics to several people last year.  In
> cleaning up my inbox I came across this reply from Ed Tennyson regarding
> how Pittsburgh Railways conducted their business.   I think I might have
> previously mentioned that Ed had worked for the Pittsburgh Railways,
> Speedrail, the City of Philadelphia, then became Deputy Secretary for Local
> and Area Transportation in PennDOT during the regime of Milton Shapp, and
> finally, in official retirement, as a consultant to the transit industry.
> Ed's perspective here is admittedly not always that of Pittsburgh Railways
> top management, but it certainly shows the mindset of people in Pittsburgh
> Railways before public ownership.  Dollars were paramount.
> Today emptying taxpayers pockets and isolating  politicians from trauma may
> be the most important things.
>
> Ed's own word begin below the break.    fws
>
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>         On busy lines, even two-man street cars were less costly than buses back
> then when buses were limited to 35 feet in length and 96 inches in width.
>         Pittsburgh had to pay street car motormen 25 cents per hour more than bus
> drivers because street cars were bigger. ATA (now APTA) data showed street
> cars cost less per passenger than buses in 1948 except in Baltimore where
> street car lines were usually long and sometimes wandering but bus lines
> were short for the most oart as shuttles or weak
>
> routes.
>         Because of the "fixed costs" you mention, motorman's wages were a lower
> pecentage of total cost than bus driver;'s wages. Pittsbsurh's political
> lawyers forced a detailed study of bustitution of the whole Pittsburgh
> system in 1947-48 and the study found that only Second Avenue (routes
> 55-56=58) were economical for bus operation. Even for them, Pittsburgh
> Railways showed the court that the consultants had made some mistakes and
> when corrected, even Second Avenue should stay rail.  I did a study of
> bustituting Route 56 to McKeesport in 1948 to accomodate a new river
> crossing bridge at Dravosburg.  My study showed trolley coaches wou;ld be
> most economical, but not by enough to justify setting up for them on just
> one route. The new bridge got rails. My study recomended that the 99
> Glassport Line be rerouted under the bridge to eliminate a proposed shuttle
> to serve a pocket of stranded homes but my boss chastized me. "We did not
> ask you to look at that".
>         In 1948, we did not know that the steel indusrty would abandon Pittsburgh
> and McKeesport would become a ghost town.
>         As I remember it, street cars cost $ 5 per car hour back then, with the
> motorman getting $ 1.55.  They carried about 60 passengers per hour at a
> cost of 8.33 cents each. We had to eliminate three rides for quarter and go
> to a dime.
>         Buses cost only $ 4 per hour with the driver at  $ 1.30  but they carried
> only 36 passengers per hour at a cost of 11 cents Pittsburgh Railways did
> not charge depreciation in rail vs bus studies.     Depreciation is a
> non-cash cost to recognize the wearing out of assets.   Rail abandon- ent
> eliminates the depreciation cost but required a big book loss to write off
> the assets junked. Bookkeeping was not the way to decide.  Pittsburgh
> figiured cash flow.  Whichever vehicle made the most net cash flow,
> including renewal of worn out property,   In 1946 after World War II and
> gasoline rationing, Pittsburgh Railways had $ 24 million cash in the bank
> despite a doubling of the wage rate from pre-war. There had been no fare
> increase.  The annual revenue collection then was $ 24 million per year.
> They could have run a whole year free fare before the money ran out.
> Obviously, they would not do that. They owed back interest on bonds from
> the Great Depression and Wall Street fought over who would get the $ 24
> million.
>         The plan was to use $ 14 million to modernize the system which had 666 PCC
> cars and maybe 500 old ones.  Ten million would go to bondholders.  That
> did not sell. The Guggenheims on Wall Street got the $ 14 million and the
> bond holders got $ 10 million.  There was no further modernization.  Tom
> Fitzgerald retired (was forced out for age) and CD Palmer took over with a
> strike almost every year. That destroyed revenue and patronage.  Pittsburgh
> had a no-strike arbitration clause in its labor conract which Fitzgerald
> always used to keep the peace at the price of the highest wages in the
> industry. Palmer claimed that when a labor cotract ended, the no strike
> clause ended with it and ruined the company by trying to save it.  Palmer
> was an engineer like me and did not understand people or unions.  He just
> hated them.  He was a very good man and nice guy otherwise but people
> always fouled things up.     They did not submit to mathmatical formulae.
>
>        E d   T e n n y s o n