[PRCo] Fwd: Boston's PCCs with Solid Steel Wheels

[Fred Schneider]

I was going to delete the name of the individual from whom this came  
but upon reading it, I see that Phil authorized me to forward it to  
the group.   It explains a whole lot about my cynicism.   A lot of  
this I've known before but not articulated quite this well.    Note  
Phil's comments relating to, if we can't properly maintain motors,  
then we'll slow down the cars to prevent flashovers.  Sad but it's a  
typical commentary on an industry that has gone to hell in a hand  
basket.   fws



> Fred:
>
> Re " I would probably agree with you on the field shunting.  Boston  
> had a  lot of trouble in the 1960s and 1970s with resilient wheels  
> on PCCs  working loose.   One friend of mine suggested that they  
> didn't have a  clue how to torque the bolts.   The problem started  
> after the  Riverside line opened and cars began running much faster  
> than they had previously.   I could research this through channels  
> with friends  but I suspect I would find out that the cutting down  
> on the speed  might have had a lot to do with not knowing, in the  
> first place, how  to keep resilient wheels tight."
>
> Your information/speculation about Boston and why its PCC cars were  
> equipped with solid wheels is wrong.  As you may recall, I was  
> employed by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority in 1979  
> as its Light Rail Vehicle Project Manager, which resulted in my  
> also being the (last) Chairman of the infamous Boston-San Francisco  
> Standard Light Rail Vehicle Committee set up to manage the  
> contracts with the Boeing Vertol Company governing the manufacture  
> of 275 SLRVs (175 ordered by MBTA and 100 by SFMR).
>
> As a condition of my accepting the job that I insisted upon being  
> made maintenance of MBTA's entire fleet of SLRVs, PCC cars, work  
> equipment, and 50 electric trolley buses, as a result I also became  
> Manager of the Green Line Equipment Department.  My hope was to be  
> able to restore resilent wheels to the PCC car fleet, then  
> numbering about 100 cars including 36 wartime-built cars that had  
> been rebuilt at an average cost of over $600,000 apiece.  Before I  
> could proceed with this, of course, I had to find out why resilient  
> wheels had been removed from the PCC car fleet in the 1960s.
>
> I was told by Steve Kirk, the Assistant Superintendent who was in  
> charge of PCC car, work equipment and trolley bus maintenance, that  
> this had been done at the order of the Masschusetts Public Utility  
> Commission.  As a result, I arranged for a meeting with the PUC  
> Inspector who was responsible for keeping tabs on the MBTA.  His  
> explanation was as follows:
>
> Following Edward F. Dana's retirement in 1959, the MBTA had allowed  
> track maintenance on what is now called the Green Line system to  
> deteriorate to the point where guard rails on sharp curves, in  
> particular at the Copley Square junction between the Boyleston  
> Street and Huntington Avenue subway lines.  The elevated guard  
> rails began cutting the exposed negative return shunts on the  
> backside of the resilient wheels of the PCC cars.  When a  
> sufficient number of shunts were cut on a wheel, the rest of them  
> burnt out.  When that happened that axle did not shunt the signal  
> system.  When both axles on the rear truck were not shunting, the  
> truck was not detected by the signal system.  When this occurred at  
> a junction, such as at Copley, a switch could be throw under the  
> car.  This did happen and derailments, which were investigated by  
> the PUC, occured.
>
> The Massachusetts PUC thereupon ordered the MBTA to either 1)  
> perform track work that restored all guard rails to proper gauge  
> (both in height and lateral spacing from the running rails); or 2)  
> replace all resilient wheels on the PCC car fleet with solid  
> wheels.  MBTA's new General Manager, Thomas J. McLernon (ex-New  
> York City Transit Authority) ordered the Car Equipment Department  
> to begin an accelerated program of installing solid wheels on the  
> entire PCC car fleet.
>
> I was told by Steve Kirk that McLernon stated in his presence that  
> making the cars noisier and rougher riding (resilient wheels being  
> part of the suspension system of a PCC car) was of no concern to  
> him because his plans called for converting the underground and  
> elevated portions of the streetcar system, along with the Highland  
> Branch/Riverside Line, to high-platform rapid transit operations.   
> All street running portions of the system (Watertown, Commonwealth  
> Avenue/Boston College, Beacon Street/Cleveland Circle, and  
> Huntington Avenue/Jamaica) were to be replaced with motor bus  
> shuttles to Kenmore Square or Copley Square under McLernon's plan,  
> which was proposed publicly.
>
> Even though the MBTA will operate four subway-surface light rail  
> lines (B, C, D and E) for decades to come, McLernon's legacy  
> remains part of the outlook of the organization to this very day,  
> witness the "temporary" bus substitution for both the Watertown and  
> Arborway lines that lead to their permanent abandonment and MBTA's  
> resistance at all costs to both restoring the Arborway line or  
> building the Silver Line (its hybrid trolley bus line ) as a light  
> rail line.
>
> Even during the year and one-half (1979-1980) that I worked for the  
> MBTA, I was repeatedly told by McLernon-era leading lights that  
> "Light rail vehicles were never designed to run in mixed traffic  
> with motor vehicles."  Telling those who knew this as a gospel  
> truth that the San Francisco Municipal Railway did not seen to  
> understand that only resulted in getting the deer-in-the-headlights  
> look from the person making the statement.
>
> Cutting the maximum allowed speed of the PCCs to 35 mph is another  
> matter not well understood. It had nothing whatsoever to do with  
> resilient wheels or tightening bolts.  It had to do with the fact  
> that motors were flashing over due to poor maintenance.  In  
> addition, with the three aspect (green, yellow, red) single-block  
> protection signal system, without enforcement of red indications,  
> in place on the Riverside Line (and in the Central Subway system),  
> rear-end collisions were occuring. With only one red signal behind  
> an occupied block, Charlie could come around a curve at speed,  
> having passed a yellow but assuming that the next signal would  
> clear to at least yellow before he got there, and find that a train  
> was stopped with its rear truck just beyond the insulating joint.   
> Bango!  Another rear-ender.
>
> [Note that conventional rapid transit signalling practice is to  
> have two reds behind an occupied block, with trip-stop enforcement  
> on either the outer red or both reds.  This, however, reduces  
> throughput, i.e., the number of trains that can be run over a line  
> during a given time period.]
>
> Reducing the balancing speed of the PCC cars from 42 mph to 35 mph  
> supposedly "imposed safety" on the Riverside Line, but reducing the  
> distance required to stop from top speed.  Of course, 25 mph,  20  
> mph or even 10 mph would be even safer.  And not running anything  
> at all would be safest.  Such was (and is) the MBTA.
>
> Since I am not a member of the Pittsburgh Railway group, I trust  
> that you will forward my observations to its members as well as to  
> Boris Cefer.
>
> With best regards,
>
> Phil
>
> Philip G. Craig
>
> P.S.  Needless to say, glad that my time in Boston turned out to be  
> brief.
>
>
>
> Fred Schneider <fwschneider at comcast.net> wrote:
>
> Sorry Boris but you fail to understand the American legal system. It
> is better to make sure windows don't open so public must keep arms,
> hands and all body parts inside. Otherwise they would get knocked
> off by tree limbs and passing cars and then the victims or their
> parents or other family members would sue the MBTA for damages rather
> than accept the fact that they are stupid for hanging out the
> windows. I don't think you were here long enough to observe the
> timing of legal advertisements on television ... they are generally
> broadcast during daytime hours when the indigent (lazy) are sitting
> around doing nothing but watching television. It is generally a we
> will make you rich scheme. If you were offended, see us and we will
> sue. If you took the wrong medicine, see us and we will get a cash
> settlement for you. If your doctor didn't make you better, come see
> the law offices of Catchem, Screwem, Twistem and Bindem. It has made
> a lot of lawyers rich. (And I know one member of this list is going
> to take offense at this. I also know I'm planning a high school
> class reunion and we have one doctor who will not come if a certain
> lawyer, who makes his living suing doctors, does come.) It is
> simpler for the transit agencies to seal the windows and air-
> condition the cars. As a sidebar, I'm reminded of a suit in New
> Orleans that went against the New Orleans RTA about a year ago ... a
> kid fell out the window of a streetcar because the mother let him sit
> next to the window and climb out ... then she sued the RTA for
> allowing it to happen. Come on now, who is negligent, the RTA for
> not putting safety bars on the window (converting the car into a
> jail) or the woman for not controlling her brat? Well, we know the
> court sided with the woman. She got big bucks.
>
> I would probably agree with you on the field shunting. Boston had a
> lot of trouble in the 1960s and 1970s with resilient wheels on PCCs
> working loose. One friend of mine suggested that they didn't have a
> clue how to torque the bolts. The problem started after the
> Riverside line opened and cars began running much faster than they
> had previously. I could research this through channels with friends
> but I suspect I would find out that the cutting down on the speed
> might have had a lot to do with not knowing, in the first place, how
> to keep resilient wheels tight.
>
> On Apr 27, 2007, at 10:06 AM, Boris Cefer wrote:
>
> It would be far better to install windows which open and  
> reestablish correct
> field shunt connections.
>
> B
>
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> Check out new cars at Yahoo! Autos.