[PRCo] Re: Fwd: Boston's PCCs with Solid Steel Wheels

[Boris Cefer]

I think the way Boston resolved the problems is not worth any comment. 
Idi....

B

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Fred Schneider" <fwschneider at comcast.net>
To: <pittsburgh-railways at dementia.org>
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2007 4:47 PM
Subject: [PRCo] Fwd: Boston's PCCs with Solid Steel Wheels


>I was going to delete the name of the individual from whom this came
> but upon reading it, I see that Phil authorized me to forward it to
> the group.   It explains a whole lot about my cynicism.   A lot of
> this I've known before but not articulated quite this well.    Note
> Phil's comments relating to, if we can't properly maintain motors,
> then we'll slow down the cars to prevent flashovers.  Sad but it's a
> typical commentary on an industry that has gone to hell in a hand
> basket.   fws
>
>
>
>> Fred:
>>
>> Re " I would probably agree with you on the field shunting.  Boston
>> had a  lot of trouble in the 1960s and 1970s with resilient wheels
>> on PCCs  working loose.   One friend of mine suggested that they
>> didn't have a  clue how to torque the bolts.   The problem started
>> after the  Riverside line opened and cars began running much faster
>> than they had previously.   I could research this through channels
>> with friends  but I suspect I would find out that the cutting down
>> on the speed  might have had a lot to do with not knowing, in the
>> first place, how  to keep resilient wheels tight."
>>
>> Your information/speculation about Boston and why its PCC cars were
>> equipped with solid wheels is wrong.  As you may recall, I was
>> employed by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority in 1979
>> as its Light Rail Vehicle Project Manager, which resulted in my
>> also being the (last) Chairman of the infamous Boston-San Francisco
>> Standard Light Rail Vehicle Committee set up to manage the
>> contracts with the Boeing Vertol Company governing the manufacture
>> of 275 SLRVs (175 ordered by MBTA and 100 by SFMR).
>>
>> As a condition of my accepting the job that I insisted upon being
>> made maintenance of MBTA's entire fleet of SLRVs, PCC cars, work
>> equipment, and 50 electric trolley buses, as a result I also became
>> Manager of the Green Line Equipment Department.  My hope was to be
>> able to restore resilent wheels to the PCC car fleet, then
>> numbering about 100 cars including 36 wartime-built cars that had
>> been rebuilt at an average cost of over $600,000 apiece.  Before I
>> could proceed with this, of course, I had to find out why resilient
>> wheels had been removed from the PCC car fleet in the 1960s.
>>
>> I was told by Steve Kirk, the Assistant Superintendent who was in
>> charge of PCC car, work equipment and trolley bus maintenance, that
>> this had been done at the order of the Masschusetts Public Utility
>> Commission.  As a result, I arranged for a meeting with the PUC
>> Inspector who was responsible for keeping tabs on the MBTA.  His
>> explanation was as follows:
>>
>> Following Edward F. Dana's retirement in 1959, the MBTA had allowed
>> track maintenance on what is now called the Green Line system to
>> deteriorate to the point where guard rails on sharp curves, in
>> particular at the Copley Square junction between the Boyleston
>> Street and Huntington Avenue subway lines.  The elevated guard
>> rails began cutting the exposed negative return shunts on the
>> backside of the resilient wheels of the PCC cars.  When a
>> sufficient number of shunts were cut on a wheel, the rest of them
>> burnt out.  When that happened that axle did not shunt the signal
>> system.  When both axles on the rear truck were not shunting, the
>> truck was not detected by the signal system.  When this occurred at
>> a junction, such as at Copley, a switch could be throw under the
>> car.  This did happen and derailments, which were investigated by
>> the PUC, occured.
>>
>> The Massachusetts PUC thereupon ordered the MBTA to either 1)
>> perform track work that restored all guard rails to proper gauge
>> (both in height and lateral spacing from the running rails); or 2)
>> replace all resilient wheels on the PCC car fleet with solid
>> wheels.  MBTA's new General Manager, Thomas J. McLernon (ex-New
>> York City Transit Authority) ordered the Car Equipment Department
>> to begin an accelerated program of installing solid wheels on the
>> entire PCC car fleet.
>>
>> I was told by Steve Kirk that McLernon stated in his presence that
>> making the cars noisier and rougher riding (resilient wheels being
>> part of the suspension system of a PCC car) was of no concern to
>> him because his plans called for converting the underground and
>> elevated portions of the streetcar system, along with the Highland
>> Branch/Riverside Line, to high-platform rapid transit operations.
>> All street running portions of the system (Watertown, Commonwealth
>> Avenue/Boston College, Beacon Street/Cleveland Circle, and
>> Huntington Avenue/Jamaica) were to be replaced with motor bus
>> shuttles to Kenmore Square or Copley Square under McLernon's plan,
>> which was proposed publicly.
>>
>> Even though the MBTA will operate four subway-surface light rail
>> lines (B, C, D and E) for decades to come, McLernon's legacy
>> remains part of the outlook of the organization to this very day,
>> witness the "temporary" bus substitution for both the Watertown and
>> Arborway lines that lead to their permanent abandonment and MBTA's
>> resistance at all costs to both restoring the Arborway line or
>> building the Silver Line (its hybrid trolley bus line ) as a light
>> rail line.
>>
>> Even during the year and one-half (1979-1980) that I worked for the
>> MBTA, I was repeatedly told by McLernon-era leading lights that
>> "Light rail vehicles were never designed to run in mixed traffic
>> with motor vehicles."  Telling those who knew this as a gospel
>> truth that the San Francisco Municipal Railway did not seen to
>> understand that only resulted in getting the deer-in-the-headlights
>> look from the person making the statement.
>>
>> Cutting the maximum allowed speed of the PCCs to 35 mph is another
>> matter not well understood. It had nothing whatsoever to do with
>> resilient wheels or tightening bolts.  It had to do with the fact
>> that motors were flashing over due to poor maintenance.  In
>> addition, with the three aspect (green, yellow, red) single-block
>> protection signal system, without enforcement of red indications,
>> in place on the Riverside Line (and in the Central Subway system),
>> rear-end collisions were occuring. With only one red signal behind
>> an occupied block, Charlie could come around a curve at speed,
>> having passed a yellow but assuming that the next signal would
>> clear to at least yellow before he got there, and find that a train
>> was stopped with its rear truck just beyond the insulating joint.
>> Bango!  Another rear-ender.
>>
>> [Note that conventional rapid transit signalling practice is to
>> have two reds behind an occupied block, with trip-stop enforcement
>> on either the outer red or both reds.  This, however, reduces
>> throughput, i.e., the number of trains that can be run over a line
>> during a given time period.]
>>
>> Reducing the balancing speed of the PCC cars from 42 mph to 35 mph
>> supposedly "imposed safety" on the Riverside Line, but reducing the
>> distance required to stop from top speed.  Of course, 25 mph,  20
>> mph or even 10 mph would be even safer.  And not running anything
>> at all would be safest.  Such was (and is) the MBTA.
>>
>> Since I am not a member of the Pittsburgh Railway group, I trust
>> that you will forward my observations to its members as well as to
>> Boris Cefer.
>>
>> With best regards,
>>
>> Phil
>>
>> Philip G. Craig
>>
>> P.S.  Needless to say, glad that my time in Boston turned out to be
>> brief.