[PRCo] Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
Derrick Brashear
shadow at gmail.com
Fri Jun 26 00:48:05 EDT 2009
I assumed it was a typo and was supposed to say "no" men are 10s. Fred?
Derrick
On Jun 26, 2009, at 0:33, Phil Craig <philgcraig204 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Fred:
>
> Once again you have demonstrated that you are a misogynist:
>
> " Gentlemen: There are no women who are 10s. There are men who
> are 10s."
>
> You also know that there are a hell of a lot of men out there in
> positions of authority throughout our society, in government, in
> businesses being run down the drain, who are absolute zeros. Women
> with similar lack of qualifications simply are not so numerous
> because relatively fewer of them penetrate the glass ceiling.
>
> Phil
>
>
> --- On Wed, 6/24/09, Schneider Fred <fwschneider at comcast.net> wrote:
>
> From: Schneider Fred <fwschneider at comcast.net>
> Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
> To: "Jack May" <jack.may at americomm.net>
> Cc: "Edson Tennyson" <etennyson at cox.net>, "Al Schneider" <alschneider2 at juno.com
> >, "Gary Olden" <Gary-elaine at comcast.net>, "Nawdry"
> <NAWDRy at bga.com>, "Kotulak Dick" <CRVLKOTULA at aol.com>, "Craig Phil" <philgcraig204 at yahoo.com
> >, "Swindler1 John" <j_swindler at hotmail.com>, "Vigrass Bill" <billvigrass at verizon.net
> >, "Bob Dietrich" <bob.dietrich1 at verizon.net>, "Bente Bruce" <bbente at bellsouth.net
> >, "Lybarger Ed" <trams2 at comcast.net>, "Allman Rich" <allmanr at verizon.net
> >, "Jackson Russ" <rejmhj at netzero.net>, "Brashear Derrick" <shadow at dementia.org
> >, "Fitzherbert Tony" <Akftrain at aol.com>, "Miklos Frank" <miklosfrank at comcast.net
> >, "JOHN AURELIUS" <jaurelius at centurytel.net>, "Russell E. Jackson" <russell.jackson at stvinc.com
> >, pittsburgh-railways at dementia.org
> Date: Wednesday, June 24, 2009, 3:44 PM
>
> I have a problem with the word disaster in conjunction with an
> accident that killed nine people on a system that moves a million
> people a day, year in and year out to be stretching things just a
> tad. So we've had three major accidents was it in 33 years and in
> that time they have moved probably somewhere on the order of
> magnitude of 6 billion revenue passengers. I think that's a pretty
> damn good record.
>
> Gentlemen: There are no women who are 10s. There are men who
> are 10s. There is no such thing as perfection. It does not exist.
>
> But I'll happily take my chances on WMATA before the Beltway around
> DC or I-70 or I-95 or the Shirley Highway or I-64.
>
> Fred Schneider
>
>
> On Jun 24, 2009, at 9:09 AM, Jack May wrote:
>
>> ‘ "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager
>> John B. Catoe Jr. said.’
>>
>>
>>
>> Red Line Train Operator Used Brakes In Failed Bid to Stop Six-Car
>> Train
>> Investigators Probe Site for Cause of Crash
>> By Lena H. Sun and Lyndsey Layton, Washington Post Staff Writers
>> Wednesday, June 24, 2009
>>
>> The operator of the Metro train that slammed into a stationary
>> train in
>> front of it apparently had activated the emergency brakes in a
>> failed effort
>> to stop before the accident, federal officials said yesterday as they
>> searched for the cause of Monday's Red Line wreck that killed nine
>> and
>> injured 80. Debbie Hersman of the National Transportation Safety
>> Board said
>> the emergency brake button, known as the "mushroom," was depressed,
>> and the
>> steel rails showed evidence that the brakes were engaged.
>> Investigators also
>> said the striking train was in automatic mode, which means onboard
>> computers
>> should have controlled its speed and stopped it before it got too
>> close to
>> the stationary train. In addition, Metro sources said, the first
>> two cars of
>> that train were two months overdue for scheduled maintenance of
>> some braking
>> components.
>>
>> Taken together, experts say these facts point to several possible
>> scenarios:
>> The operator activated the brakes too late; the computers that are
>> supposed
>> to stop a train from getting too close to another train faltered; the
>> train's brakes failed; or some combination of those. Some
>> passengers on the
>> striking train have said that they never felt the train slow down.
>> A team of
>> NTSB investigators painstakingly searched through the tangled heap
>> of metal
>> on the tracks just north of the Fort Totten Station in Northeast
>> Washington.
>> They were examining everything: the condition of the trains, track
>> and
>> signals; the actions of the operator and her downtown supervisors;
>> and the
>> computers that control train movement and are supposed to
>> automatically
>> prevent crashes. Investigators will also look at maintenance work
>> performed
>> this month on the computerized train control system along the
>> stretch of
>> track where the crash took place.
>>
>> Officials began to remove the cars from the trains yesterday and
>> plan to try
>> to experiment with similar trains to determine approximate speed and
>> stopping distance, Hersman said. Service on the Red Line will
>> continue to be
>> disrupted while the investigation proceeds. The crash, the force of
>> which
>> vaulted the striking train atop the one it rammed, occurred on a
>> curve where
>> the speed limit is 59 mph, Hersman said. Today's experiment will
>> also try to
>> determine whether the curve, or anything else, obstructed the train
>> operator's view of the stopped train. The operator, Jeanice
>> McMillan, 42,
>> was among those who died in the accident. Investigators will
>> examine her
>> cellphone and text-messaging records, review her work and rest
>> schedule, and
>> analyze blood samples, all standard NTSB procedures. Investigators
>> are also
>> delving into the automatic train protection system, which is
>> designed to
>> make collisions impossible. Had the system been working correctly,
>> it would
>> have sensed that Train 112 was getting too close to Train 214 and
>> directed
>> the brakes aboard Train 112 to engage.
>>
>> "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager
>> John B.
>> Catoe Jr. said. Catoe said it was too early in the investigation to
>> know
>> what caused the crash, but he said there was "no evidence" that the
>> operator
>> was using a cellphone or texting at the time of the crash. After a
>> special
>> board meeting yesterday, he told reporters, "There's not a letter of
>> evidence" to indicate operator error. And right now, he said, there
>> is also
>> no indication of signal failure.
>>
>> The six cars that made up Train 112 were put together in an unusual
>> way.
>> Metro trains operate in married pairs of cars, and the lead car is
>> almost
>> always an "A" car, which some operators say run more smoothly and
>> communicate better with the electronic devices buried along the
>> track. But
>> in the case of Train 112, the lead car was a "B" car, Metro
>> officials said.
>> It was unclear last night why the train was configured that way. It
>> was also
>> unclear what effect, if any, the configuration could have had on
>> the crash.
>> The cars were among the oldest in Metro's fleet, purchased between
>> 1974 and
>> 1978 from Rohr Industries for the opening of the subway system.
>> They have
>> been rehabilitated and retrofitted "to keep them in good
>> condition," said
>> Metro board Chairman Jim Graham of the District. But federal
>> investigators
>> consider the cars to be unsafe because of a tendency during a crash
>> to
>> collapse into one another like a telescope, reducing the
>> "survivability"
>> space, or the area in a car in which passengers can escape harm.
>> The force
>> of the impact sheared the lead car of Train 112, pushing part of it
>> onto the
>> roof of the trailing car of Train 214 and slamming the rest into
>> the body of
>> Train 214. Two-thirds of Train 112's lead car was crushed, Hersman
>> said.
>>
>> After a Rohr train telescoped during a 2004 crash at the Woodley
>> Park-Zoo/Adams Morgan Station, the NTSB recommended that Metro
>> retire the
>> Rohrs or strengthen their frames to prevent collapse. But the
>> transit agency
>> declined, saying that the cars make up one-third of the fleet and
>> that Metro
>> could not afford to mothball them ahead of their planned retirement
>> in 2014,
>> and that retrofitting would be costly and impractical. The NTSB,
>> which makes
>> safety recommendations but has no enforcement authority, disagreed
>> with
>> Metro's stance, calling it "unacceptable" at the time.
>>
>> Yesterday, Hersman again questioned the safety of the Rohr cars and
>> blamed
>> Metro for failing to act. "We recommended to [Metro] to either
>> retrofit
>> those cars or phase them out of service," she said. "Those concerns
>> were not
>> addressed." Metro uses 290 1000 series cars, which make up more
>> than 25
>> percent of its 1,126-car fleet. Graham said replacing the cars
>> would cost
>> almost $1 billion, money that Metro does not have. Metro is the
>> only major
>> transit system in the country without a source of dedicated funds.
>> The
>> agency appeals every year to the District, Virginia and Maryland for
>> funding, a situation that makes long-term planning difficult.
>>
>> The NTSB also recommended that Metro install data recorders,
>> similar to the
>> black boxes found in airplanes, in all of its cars after the 2004
>> crash.
>> Although the agency installed recorders in some of its newest cars,
>> the Rohr
>> cars did not have them -- a condition that Hersman also called
>> unacceptable.
>> Metro officials also did not install critical software revisions
>> that would
>> have allowed investigators to determine whether the operator had
>> applied the
>> emergency brakes and the train's speed during braking, according to
>> a source
>> knowledgeable about the braking systems. Investigators might be
>> able to
>> determine whether the emergency brakes were deployed based on
>> physical
>> evidence.
>>
>> Metro's automated system is built around electronic relays on the
>> trains and
>> buried along the track that allow onboard computers to control
>> speeds and
>> stop trains from getting too close to one another. Over the past
>> decade,
>> Metro has struggled with troublesome relays. The agency tore out
>> all 20,000
>> trackside relays in 1999 after discovering that a small portion
>> designed to
>> last 70 years were failing after 25. The manufacturer, Alstom
>> Signaling,
>> agreed to replace the relays at a cost to Metro of about $8
>> million. None of
>> the new relays have failed, one Metro official said. The NTSB and the
>> Federal Transit Administration have criticized Metro for failing to
>> act
>> aggressively to address safety problems, especially at the time of
>> a 1996
>> crash at Shady Grove
>> that killed a train operator.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Edson Tennyson [mailto:etennyson at cox.net]
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 12:54 AM
>> To: Al Schneider; Gary Olden; Lyndon Henry <NAWDRy at bga.com> <NAWDRy at bga.com
>> >
>> Cc: CRVLKOTULA at aol.com; fwschneider at comcast.net; philgcraig204 at yahoo.com
>> ; j_swindler at hotmail.com; billvigrass at verizon.net; bob.dietrich1 at verizon.net
>> ; bbente at bellsouth.net; trams2 at comcast.net; allmanr at verizon.net; rejmhj at netzero.net
>> ; shadow at dementia.org; Akftrain at aol.com; miklosfrank at comcast.net; jack.may at americomm.net
>> ; jaurelius at centurytel.net; russell.jackson at stvinc.com
>> Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
>>
>> SHADY GROVE REAR END ACCIDENT THAT KILLED MOTORMAN
>> I do not know which kind of car was in the Shady Grove fatality,
>> but it had nothing to do with
>> the car body design other than the brakes. It was a faulty brake
>> design. All cars have the same faulty
>> brake design.
>> The brake design is very similar to my Silverliner commuter cars
>> in Philadelphia we bought in 1964, ten
>> years before Rohr. Budd invented a disc brake and wanted to sell
>> it. They sold it to Califorfnia Zephyr
>> and similar good trains and they demanded we take it. I said
>> "NO." The railroads said "yes" It was good
>> enough for Zeohyrs. it was good enough for fhem, It would save
>> wheel wear. It really wouid. I agree.
>> The problems were (1) we used no locomotives with brake shoes
>> (and maybe dynamic brakes) to clean the
>> wheels and rail. (2) Dirty wheels do not shunt signals well
>> enough. (3) DIrty wheels may slide.
>> We wanted dynamic brakes but P.RR would not allow them on eMU
>> cars. They falsely said it would cost too
>> much to maintain the motors. Research said otherwise but they were
>> steadfast. My boss told me there would
>> be no new cars if I did not give in so I had to accept a lousy
>> brake system.
>> In very cold, fine snow weather, with very cold wheels, ice
>> builds up on the faces of the brake pads that grip the
>> frozen brake discs. There is no brake as a result, until it wears
>> off and warms up. Too late. and several wrecks
>> but not bad enough to get top level attention UNTIL a train passed
>> up the Chairman of the Board, Stuart Saunders
>> and his chief of staff. FIRE THE MOTORMAN ! Yes sir. The union
>> had a grievance proceedure and blamed
>> the brakes. They often do that but time they were right. The
>> procedure got the motorman his job back and
>> the Chairman of the Board ordered disc brakes off the cars. In
>> two weeks we had a whole fleet with tread brakes
>> and warm wheels. Hot wheels some times, which was not good, but
>> was safer than no winter brakes. I got the bill
>> but I refused to pay it and told them why. They dod not sue me.
>> WMATA had the very same problem, and dynamic brakes made it worse
>> with colder wheels.
>> The WMATA motorman knew he was in bad trouble so he asked the
>> dispatcher (controller) for permission to cut
>> out the automation which knew nothing about very cold brakes. The
>> central control did not have the gumption to
>> say "OK" so they said "NO". The Assistant General Manager insisted
>> on automatic operation at all times.
>> Within 15 minutes of being denied permission the poor dumb
>> motorman was dead. I say dumb because it would have
>> been better to lose his job than his life. He was a very good man
>> but he followed evil orders. That Assistant General
>> Manager was soon gone.. He was in many ways, an excellent manager
>> but he was far too headstrong.
>>
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>> E d T e n n y s o n
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>> On Jun 24, 2009, at 12:56 AM, alschneider2 at juno.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> Wasn't the Shady Grove disaster that killed the operator also
>> involve Rohrs?
>>
>> And the Rhode Island Av collision that destroyed one Rohr occurred
>> around 1980.
>>
>
>
>
>
> Alan L. Schneider
>
>
>
> ____________________________________________________________
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>
>
>
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