[PRCo] Re: METRORAIL DISASTER

[Schneider Fred]

Yes.   Absolutely.   I didn't catch that.   I'm simply saying that  
there is room for 99% performance but there is no room in industry to  
pay for 100%.   Reaching for the starts only frustrates those around us.

On Jun 26, 2009, at 12:48 AM, Derrick Brashear wrote:

> I assumed it was a typo and was supposed to say "no" men are 10s.  
> Fred?
>
> Derrick
>
>
> On Jun 26, 2009, at 0:33, Phil Craig <philgcraig204 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>> Fred:
>>
>> Once again you have demonstrated that you are a misogynist:
>>
>> " Gentlemen:    There are no women who are 10s.   There are men  
>> who are 10s."
>>
>> You also know that there are a hell of a lot of men out there in  
>> positions of authority throughout our society, in government, in  
>> businesses being run down the drain, who are absolute zeros.   
>> Women with similar lack of qualifications simply are not so  
>> numerous because relatively fewer of them penetrate the glass  
>> ceiling.
>>
>> Phil
>>
>>
>> --- On Wed, 6/24/09, Schneider Fred <fwschneider at comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>> From: Schneider Fred <fwschneider at comcast.net>
>> Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
>> To: "Jack May" <jack.may at americomm.net>
>> Cc: "Edson Tennyson" <etennyson at cox.net>, "Al Schneider"  
>> <alschneider2 at juno.com>, "Gary Olden" <Gary-elaine at comcast.net>,  
>> "Nawdry" <NAWDRy at bga.com>, "Kotulak Dick" <CRVLKOTULA at aol.com>,  
>> "Craig Phil" <philgcraig204 at yahoo.com>, "Swindler1 John"  
>> <j_swindler at hotmail.com>, "Vigrass Bill"  
>> <billvigrass at verizon.net>, "Bob Dietrich"  
>> <bob.dietrich1 at verizon.net>, "Bente Bruce" <bbente at bellsouth.net>,  
>> "Lybarger Ed" <trams2 at comcast.net>, "Allman Rich"  
>> <allmanr at verizon.net>, "Jackson Russ" <rejmhj at netzero.net>,  
>> "Brashear Derrick" <shadow at dementia.org>, "Fitzherbert Tony"  
>> <Akftrain at aol.com>, "Miklos Frank" <miklosfrank at comcast.net>,  
>> "JOHN AURELIUS" <jaurelius at centurytel.net>, "Russell E. Jackson"  
>> <russell.jackson at stvinc.com>, pittsburgh-railways at dementia.org
>> Date: Wednesday, June 24, 2009, 3:44 PM
>>
>> I have a problem with the word disaster in conjunction with an  
>> accident that killed nine people on a system that moves a million  
>> people a day, year in and year out to be stretching things just a  
>> tad.   So we've had three major accidents was it in 33 years and  
>> in that time they have moved probably somewhere on the order of  
>> magnitude of 6 billion revenue passengers.   I think that's a  
>> pretty damn good record.
>>
>> Gentlemen:    There are no women who are 10s.   There are men who  
>> are 10s.   There is no such thing as perfection.   It does not exist.
>>
>> But I'll happily take my chances on WMATA before the Beltway  
>> around DC or I-70 or I-95 or the Shirley Highway or I-64.
>>
>> Fred Schneider
>>
>>
>> On Jun 24, 2009, at 9:09 AM, Jack May wrote:
>>
>>> ‘ "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager  
>>> John B. Catoe Jr. said.’
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Red Line Train Operator Used Brakes In Failed Bid to Stop Six-Car  
>>> Train
>>> Investigators Probe Site for Cause of Crash
>>> By Lena H. Sun and Lyndsey Layton, Washington Post Staff Writers
>>> Wednesday, June 24, 2009
>>>
>>> The operator of the Metro train that slammed into a stationary  
>>> train in
>>> front of it apparently had activated the emergency brakes in a  
>>> failed effort
>>> to stop before the accident, federal officials said yesterday as  
>>> they
>>> searched for the cause of Monday's Red Line wreck that killed  
>>> nine and
>>> injured 80. Debbie Hersman of the National Transportation Safety  
>>> Board said
>>> the emergency brake button, known as the "mushroom," was  
>>> depressed, and the
>>> steel rails showed evidence that the brakes were engaged.  
>>> Investigators also
>>> said the striking train was in automatic mode, which means  
>>> onboard computers
>>> should have controlled its speed and stopped it before it got too  
>>> close to
>>> the stationary train. In addition, Metro sources said, the first  
>>> two cars of
>>> that train were two months overdue for scheduled maintenance of  
>>> some braking
>>> components.
>>>
>>> Taken together, experts say these facts point to several possible  
>>> scenarios:
>>> The operator activated the brakes too late; the computers that  
>>> are supposed
>>> to stop a train from getting too close to another train faltered;  
>>> the
>>> train's brakes failed; or some combination of those. Some  
>>> passengers on the
>>> striking train have said that they never felt the train slow  
>>> down. A team of
>>> NTSB investigators painstakingly searched through the tangled  
>>> heap of metal
>>> on the tracks just north of the Fort Totten Station in Northeast  
>>> Washington.
>>> They were examining everything: the condition of the trains,  
>>> track and
>>> signals; the actions of the operator and her downtown  
>>> supervisors; and the
>>> computers that control train movement and are supposed to  
>>> automatically
>>> prevent crashes. Investigators will also look at maintenance work  
>>> performed
>>> this month on the computerized train control system along the  
>>> stretch of
>>> track where the crash took place.
>>>
>>> Officials began to remove the cars from the trains yesterday and  
>>> plan to try
>>> to experiment with similar trains to determine approximate speed and
>>> stopping distance, Hersman said. Service on the Red Line will  
>>> continue to be
>>> disrupted while the investigation proceeds. The crash, the force  
>>> of which
>>> vaulted the striking train atop the one it rammed, occurred on a  
>>> curve where
>>> the speed limit is 59 mph, Hersman said. Today's experiment will  
>>> also try to
>>> determine whether the curve, or anything else, obstructed the train
>>> operator's view of the stopped train. The operator, Jeanice  
>>> McMillan, 42,
>>> was among those who died in the accident. Investigators will  
>>> examine her
>>> cellphone and text-messaging records, review her work and rest  
>>> schedule, and
>>> analyze blood samples, all standard NTSB procedures.  
>>> Investigators are also
>>> delving into the automatic train protection system, which is  
>>> designed to
>>> make collisions impossible. Had the system been working  
>>> correctly, it would
>>> have sensed that Train 112 was getting too close to Train 214 and  
>>> directed
>>> the brakes aboard Train 112 to engage.
>>>
>>> "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager  
>>> John B.
>>> Catoe Jr. said. Catoe said it was too early in the investigation  
>>> to know
>>> what caused the crash, but he said there was "no evidence" that  
>>> the operator
>>> was using a cellphone or texting at the time of the crash. After  
>>> a special
>>> board meeting yesterday, he told reporters, "There's not a letter of
>>> evidence" to indicate operator error. And right now, he said,  
>>> there is also
>>> no indication of signal failure.
>>>
>>> The six cars that made up Train 112 were put together in an  
>>> unusual way.
>>> Metro trains operate in married pairs of cars, and the lead car  
>>> is almost
>>> always an "A" car, which some operators say run more smoothly and
>>> communicate better with the electronic devices buried along the  
>>> track. But
>>> in the case of Train 112, the lead car was a "B" car, Metro  
>>> officials said.
>>> It was unclear last night why the train was configured that way.  
>>> It was also
>>> unclear what effect, if any, the configuration could have had on  
>>> the crash.
>>> The cars were among the oldest in Metro's fleet, purchased  
>>> between 1974 and
>>> 1978 from Rohr Industries for the opening of the subway system.  
>>> They have
>>> been rehabilitated and retrofitted "to keep them in good  
>>> condition," said
>>> Metro board Chairman Jim Graham of the District. But federal  
>>> investigators
>>> consider the cars to be unsafe because of a tendency during a  
>>> crash to
>>> collapse into one another like a telescope, reducing the  
>>> "survivability"
>>> space, or the area in a car in which passengers can escape harm.  
>>> The force
>>> of the impact sheared the lead car of Train 112, pushing part of  
>>> it onto the
>>> roof of the trailing car of Train 214 and slamming the rest into  
>>> the body of
>>> Train 214. Two-thirds of Train 112's lead car was crushed,  
>>> Hersman said.
>>>
>>> After a Rohr train telescoped during a 2004 crash at the Woodley
>>> Park-Zoo/Adams Morgan Station, the NTSB recommended that Metro  
>>> retire the
>>> Rohrs or strengthen their frames to prevent collapse. But the  
>>> transit agency
>>> declined, saying that the cars make up one-third of the fleet and  
>>> that Metro
>>> could not afford to mothball them ahead of their planned  
>>> retirement in 2014,
>>> and that retrofitting would be costly and impractical. The NTSB,  
>>> which makes
>>> safety recommendations but has no enforcement authority,  
>>> disagreed with
>>> Metro's stance, calling it "unacceptable" at the time.
>>>
>>> Yesterday, Hersman again questioned the safety of the Rohr cars  
>>> and blamed
>>> Metro for failing to act. "We recommended to [Metro] to either  
>>> retrofit
>>> those cars or phase them out of service," she said. "Those  
>>> concerns were not
>>> addressed." Metro uses 290 1000 series cars, which make up more  
>>> than 25
>>> percent of its 1,126-car fleet. Graham said replacing the cars  
>>> would cost
>>> almost $1 billion, money that Metro does not have. Metro is the  
>>> only major
>>> transit system in the country without a source of dedicated  
>>> funds. The
>>> agency appeals every year to the District, Virginia and Maryland for
>>> funding, a situation that makes long-term planning difficult.
>>>
>>> The NTSB also recommended that Metro install data recorders,  
>>> similar to the
>>> black boxes found in airplanes, in all of its cars after the 2004  
>>> crash.
>>> Although the agency installed recorders in some of its newest  
>>> cars, the Rohr
>>> cars did not have them -- a condition that Hersman also called  
>>> unacceptable.
>>> Metro officials also did not install critical software revisions  
>>> that would
>>> have allowed investigators to determine whether the operator had  
>>> applied the
>>> emergency brakes and the train's speed during braking, according  
>>> to a source
>>> knowledgeable about the braking systems. Investigators might be  
>>> able to
>>> determine whether the emergency brakes were deployed based on  
>>> physical
>>> evidence.
>>>
>>> Metro's automated system is built around electronic relays on the  
>>> trains and
>>> buried along the track that allow onboard computers to control  
>>> speeds and
>>> stop trains from getting too close to one another. Over the past  
>>> decade,
>>> Metro has struggled with troublesome relays. The agency tore out  
>>> all 20,000
>>> trackside relays in 1999 after discovering that a small portion  
>>> designed to
>>> last 70 years were failing after 25. The manufacturer, Alstom  
>>> Signaling,
>>> agreed to replace the relays at a cost to Metro of about $8  
>>> million. None of
>>> the new relays have failed, one Metro official said. The NTSB and  
>>> the
>>> Federal Transit Administration have criticized Metro for failing  
>>> to act
>>> aggressively to address safety problems, especially at the time  
>>> of a 1996
>>> crash at Shady Grove
>>> that killed a train operator.
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Edson Tennyson [mailto:etennyson at cox.net]
>>> Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 12:54 AM
>>> To: Al Schneider; Gary Olden; Lyndon Henry <NAWDRy at bga.com>  
>>> <NAWDRy at bga.com>
>>> Cc: CRVLKOTULA at aol.com; fwschneider at comcast.net;  
>>> philgcraig204 at yahoo.com; j_swindler at hotmail.com;  
>>> billvigrass at verizon.net; bob.dietrich1 at verizon.net;  
>>> bbente at bellsouth.net; trams2 at comcast.net; allmanr at verizon.net;  
>>> rejmhj at netzero.net; shadow at dementia.org; Akftrain at aol.com;  
>>> miklosfrank at comcast.net; jack.may at americomm.net;  
>>> jaurelius at centurytel.net; russell.jackson at stvinc.com
>>> Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
>>>
>>>  SHADY GROVE REAR END ACCIDENT THAT KILLED MOTORMAN
>>>  I do not know which kind of car was in the Shady Grove fatality,  
>>> but it had nothing to do with
>>> the car body design other than the brakes. It was a faulty brake  
>>> design.  All cars have the same faulty
>>> brake design.
>>>   The brake design is very similar to my Silverliner commuter  
>>> cars in Philadelphia we bought in 1964, ten
>>> years before Rohr.  Budd invented a disc brake and wanted to sell  
>>> it.  They sold it to Califorfnia Zephyr
>>> and similar good trains and they demanded we take it. I  said  
>>> "NO."  The railroads said "yes"  It was good
>>> enough for Zeohyrs. it was good enough for fhem, It would  save  
>>> wheel  wear. It really wouid. I agree.
>>>   The problems were (1) we used no locomotives with brake shoes  
>>> (and maybe dynamic brakes)  to clean the
>>> wheels and rail.  (2) Dirty wheels  do not shunt signals well  
>>> enough. (3) DIrty wheels may slide.
>>>   We wanted dynamic brakes but P.RR would not allow them on eMU  
>>> cars. They falsely said it would cost too
>>> much to maintain the motors.  Research said otherwise but they  
>>> were steadfast.  My boss  told me there would
>>> be no new cars if I did not give in so I had to accept a lousy  
>>> brake system.
>>>    In very cold, fine snow weather, with very cold wheels, ice  
>>> builds up on the faces of the brake pads that grip the
>>> frozen brake discs.  There is no brake as a result, until it  
>>> wears off and warms up.  Too late. and  several wrecks
>>> but not bad enough to get top level attention  UNTIL a train  
>>> passed up the Chairman of the Board, Stuart Saunders
>>> and his chief of staff.  FIRE THE MOTORMAN !  Yes sir. The union  
>>> had a grievance proceedure and  blamed
>>> the brakes.  They often do that but time they were right. The  
>>> procedure got the motorman his job back and
>>> the Chairman of the Board ordered  disc brakes off the cars.  In   
>>> two weeks we had a whole fleet with tread brakes
>>> and warm wheels.  Hot wheels some times, which was not good, but  
>>> was safer than no winter brakes. I got the bill
>>> but I refused to pay it and told them why. They dod not sue me.
>>> WMATA had the very same problem, and dynamic brakes made it worse  
>>> with colder wheels.
>>>   The WMATA motorman knew he was in bad trouble so he asked the  
>>> dispatcher (controller) for permission to cut
>>> out the automation which knew nothing about very cold brakes. The  
>>> central control did not have the gumption to
>>> say "OK" so they said "NO".  The Assistant General Manager  
>>> insisted on automatic operation at all times.
>>> Within 15 minutes of being  denied permission  the poor dumb  
>>> motorman was dead.  I say dumb because it would have
>>> been better to lose his job than his life. He was a very good man  
>>> but he followed evil orders. That Assistant General
>>> Manager was soon gone..  He was in many ways, an excellent  
>>> manager but he was far too headstrong.
>>>                                                                      
>>>                                                                      
>>>                                                                      
>>>                                    E d   T e n n y s o n
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jun 24, 2009, at 12:56 AM, alschneider2 at juno.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Wasn't the Shady Grove disaster that killed the operator also  
>>> involve Rohrs?
>>>
>>> And the Rhode Island Av collision that destroyed one Rohr  
>>> occurred around 1980.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>                       Alan L. Schneider
>>
>>
>>
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