[PRCo] Re: METRORAIL DISASTER

[Schneider Fred]

I have a problem with the word disaster in conjunction with an  
accident that killed nine people on a system that moves a million  
people a day, year in and year out to be stretching things just a  
tad.   So we've had three major accidents was it in 33 years and in  
that time they have moved probably somewhere on the order of  
magnitude of 6 billion revenue passengers.   I think that's a pretty  
damn good record.
Gentlemen:    There are no women who are 10s.   There are men who are  
10s.   There is no such thing as perfection.   It does not exist.

But I'll happily take my chances on WMATA before the Beltway around  
DC or I-70 or I-95 or the Shirley Highway or I-64.

Fred Schneider


On Jun 24, 2009, at 9:09 AM, Jack May wrote:

> ‘ "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager  
> John B. Catoe Jr. said.’
>
>
>
> Red Line Train Operator Used Brakes In Failed Bid to Stop Six-Car  
> Train
> Investigators Probe Site for Cause of Crash
> By Lena H. Sun and Lyndsey Layton, Washington Post Staff Writers
> Wednesday, June 24, 2009
>
> The operator of the Metro train that slammed into a stationary  
> train in
> front of it apparently had activated the emergency brakes in a  
> failed effort
> to stop before the accident, federal officials said yesterday as they
> searched for the cause of Monday's Red Line wreck that killed nine and
> injured 80. Debbie Hersman of the National Transportation Safety  
> Board said
> the emergency brake button, known as the "mushroom," was depressed,  
> and the
> steel rails showed evidence that the brakes were engaged.  
> Investigators also
> said the striking train was in automatic mode, which means onboard  
> computers
> should have controlled its speed and stopped it before it got too  
> close to
> the stationary train. In addition, Metro sources said, the first  
> two cars of
> that train were two months overdue for scheduled maintenance of  
> some braking
> components.
>
> Taken together, experts say these facts point to several possible  
> scenarios:
> The operator activated the brakes too late; the computers that are  
> supposed
> to stop a train from getting too close to another train faltered; the
> train's brakes failed; or some combination of those. Some  
> passengers on the
> striking train have said that they never felt the train slow down.  
> A team of
> NTSB investigators painstakingly searched through the tangled heap  
> of metal
> on the tracks just north of the Fort Totten Station in Northeast  
> Washington.
> They were examining everything: the condition of the trains, track and
> signals; the actions of the operator and her downtown supervisors;  
> and the
> computers that control train movement and are supposed to  
> automatically
> prevent crashes. Investigators will also look at maintenance work  
> performed
> this month on the computerized train control system along the  
> stretch of
> track where the crash took place.
>
> Officials began to remove the cars from the trains yesterday and  
> plan to try
> to experiment with similar trains to determine approximate speed and
> stopping distance, Hersman said. Service on the Red Line will  
> continue to be
> disrupted while the investigation proceeds. The crash, the force of  
> which
> vaulted the striking train atop the one it rammed, occurred on a  
> curve where
> the speed limit is 59 mph, Hersman said. Today's experiment will  
> also try to
> determine whether the curve, or anything else, obstructed the train
> operator's view of the stopped train. The operator, Jeanice  
> McMillan, 42,
> was among those who died in the accident. Investigators will  
> examine her
> cellphone and text-messaging records, review her work and rest  
> schedule, and
> analyze blood samples, all standard NTSB procedures. Investigators  
> are also
> delving into the automatic train protection system, which is  
> designed to
> make collisions impossible. Had the system been working correctly,  
> it would
> have sensed that Train 112 was getting too close to Train 214 and  
> directed
> the brakes aboard Train 112 to engage.
>
> "I truly believe Metro is a safe system," Metro General Manager  
> John B.
> Catoe Jr. said. Catoe said it was too early in the investigation to  
> know
> what caused the crash, but he said there was "no evidence" that the  
> operator
> was using a cellphone or texting at the time of the crash. After a  
> special
> board meeting yesterday, he told reporters, "There's not a letter of
> evidence" to indicate operator error. And right now, he said, there  
> is also
> no indication of signal failure.
>
> The six cars that made up Train 112 were put together in an unusual  
> way.
> Metro trains operate in married pairs of cars, and the lead car is  
> almost
> always an "A" car, which some operators say run more smoothly and
> communicate better with the electronic devices buried along the  
> track. But
> in the case of Train 112, the lead car was a "B" car, Metro  
> officials said.
> It was unclear last night why the train was configured that way. It  
> was also
> unclear what effect, if any, the configuration could have had on  
> the crash.
> The cars were among the oldest in Metro's fleet, purchased between  
> 1974 and
> 1978 from Rohr Industries for the opening of the subway system.  
> They have
> been rehabilitated and retrofitted "to keep them in good  
> condition," said
> Metro board Chairman Jim Graham of the District. But federal  
> investigators
> consider the cars to be unsafe because of a tendency during a crash to
> collapse into one another like a telescope, reducing the  
> "survivability"
> space, or the area in a car in which passengers can escape harm.  
> The force
> of the impact sheared the lead car of Train 112, pushing part of it  
> onto the
> roof of the trailing car of Train 214 and slamming the rest into  
> the body of
> Train 214. Two-thirds of Train 112's lead car was crushed, Hersman  
> said.
>
> After a Rohr train telescoped during a 2004 crash at the Woodley
> Park-Zoo/Adams Morgan Station, the NTSB recommended that Metro  
> retire the
> Rohrs or strengthen their frames to prevent collapse. But the  
> transit agency
> declined, saying that the cars make up one-third of the fleet and  
> that Metro
> could not afford to mothball them ahead of their planned retirement  
> in 2014,
> and that retrofitting would be costly and impractical. The NTSB,  
> which makes
> safety recommendations but has no enforcement authority, disagreed  
> with
> Metro's stance, calling it "unacceptable" at the time.
>
> Yesterday, Hersman again questioned the safety of the Rohr cars and  
> blamed
> Metro for failing to act. "We recommended to [Metro] to either  
> retrofit
> those cars or phase them out of service," she said. "Those concerns  
> were not
> addressed." Metro uses 290 1000 series cars, which make up more  
> than 25
> percent of its 1,126-car fleet. Graham said replacing the cars  
> would cost
> almost $1 billion, money that Metro does not have. Metro is the  
> only major
> transit system in the country without a source of dedicated funds. The
> agency appeals every year to the District, Virginia and Maryland for
> funding, a situation that makes long-term planning difficult.
>
> The NTSB also recommended that Metro install data recorders,  
> similar to the
> black boxes found in airplanes, in all of its cars after the 2004  
> crash.
> Although the agency installed recorders in some of its newest cars,  
> the Rohr
> cars did not have them -- a condition that Hersman also called  
> unacceptable.
> Metro officials also did not install critical software revisions  
> that would
> have allowed investigators to determine whether the operator had  
> applied the
> emergency brakes and the train's speed during braking, according to  
> a source
> knowledgeable about the braking systems. Investigators might be  
> able to
> determine whether the emergency brakes were deployed based on physical
> evidence.
>
> Metro's automated system is built around electronic relays on the  
> trains and
> buried along the track that allow onboard computers to control  
> speeds and
> stop trains from getting too close to one another. Over the past  
> decade,
> Metro has struggled with troublesome relays. The agency tore out  
> all 20,000
> trackside relays in 1999 after discovering that a small portion  
> designed to
> last 70 years were failing after 25. The manufacturer, Alstom  
> Signaling,
> agreed to replace the relays at a cost to Metro of about $8  
> million. None of
> the new relays have failed, one Metro official said. The NTSB and the
> Federal Transit Administration have criticized Metro for failing to  
> act
> aggressively to address safety problems, especially at the time of  
> a 1996
> crash at Shady Grove
> that killed a train operator.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Edson Tennyson [mailto:etennyson at cox.net]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 12:54 AM
> To: Al Schneider; Gary Olden; Lyndon Henry <NAWDRy at bga.com>  
> <NAWDRy at bga.com>
> Cc: CRVLKOTULA at aol.com; fwschneider at comcast.net;  
> philgcraig204 at yahoo.com; j_swindler at hotmail.com;  
> billvigrass at verizon.net; bob.dietrich1 at verizon.net;  
> bbente at bellsouth.net; trams2 at comcast.net; allmanr at verizon.net;  
> rejmhj at netzero.net; shadow at dementia.org; Akftrain at aol.com;  
> miklosfrank at comcast.net; jack.may at americomm.net;  
> jaurelius at centurytel.net; russell.jackson at stvinc.com
> Subject: Re: METRORAIL DISASTER
>
>  SHADY GROVE REAR END ACCIDENT THAT KILLED MOTORMAN
>  I do not know which kind of car was in the Shady Grove fatality,  
> but it had nothing to do with
> the car body design other than the brakes. It was a faulty brake  
> design.  All cars have the same faulty
> brake design.
>   The brake design is very similar to my Silverliner commuter cars  
> in Philadelphia we bought in 1964, ten
> years before Rohr.  Budd invented a disc brake and wanted to sell  
> it.  They sold it to Califorfnia Zephyr
> and similar good trains and they demanded we take it. I  said  
> "NO."  The railroads said "yes"  It was good
> enough for Zeohyrs. it was good enough for fhem, It would  save  
> wheel  wear. It really wouid. I agree.
>   The problems were (1) we used no locomotives with brake shoes  
> (and maybe dynamic brakes)  to clean the
> wheels and rail.  (2) Dirty wheels  do not shunt signals well  
> enough. (3) DIrty wheels may slide.
>   We wanted dynamic brakes but P.RR would not allow them on eMU  
> cars. They falsely said it would cost too
> much to maintain the motors.  Research said otherwise but they were  
> steadfast.  My boss  told me there would
> be no new cars if I did not give in so I had to accept a lousy  
> brake system.
>    In very cold, fine snow weather, with very cold wheels, ice  
> builds up on the faces of the brake pads that grip the
> frozen brake discs.  There is no brake as a result, until it wears  
> off and warms up.  Too late. and  several wrecks
> but not bad enough to get top level attention  UNTIL a train passed  
> up the Chairman of the Board, Stuart Saunders
> and his chief of staff.  FIRE THE MOTORMAN !  Yes sir. The union  
> had a grievance proceedure and  blamed
> the brakes.  They often do that but time they were right. The  
> procedure got the motorman his job back and
> the Chairman of the Board ordered  disc brakes off the cars.  In   
> two weeks we had a whole fleet with tread brakes
> and warm wheels.  Hot wheels some times, which was not good, but  
> was safer than no winter brakes. I got the bill
> but I refused to pay it and told them why. They dod not sue me.
> WMATA had the very same problem, and dynamic brakes made it worse  
> with colder wheels.
>   The WMATA motorman knew he was in bad trouble so he asked the  
> dispatcher (controller) for permission to cut
> out the automation which knew nothing about very cold brakes. The  
> central control did not have the gumption to
> say "OK" so they said "NO".  The Assistant General Manager insisted  
> on automatic operation at all times.
> Within 15 minutes of being  denied permission  the poor dumb  
> motorman was dead.  I say dumb because it would have
> been better to lose his job than his life. He was a very good man  
> but he followed evil orders. That Assistant General
> Manager was soon gone..  He was in many ways, an excellent manager  
> but he was far too headstrong.
>                                                                        
>                                                                        
>                                                                        
>                              E d   T e n n y s o n
>
>
> On Jun 24, 2009, at 12:56 AM, alschneider2 at juno.com wrote:
>
>
> Wasn't the Shady Grove disaster that killed the operator also  
> involve Rohrs?
>
> And the Rhode Island Av collision that destroyed one Rohr occurred  
> around 1980.
>
>
>
>
>                       Alan L. Schneider
>
>
>
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